From: | Lionel Smith, Prof. <lionel.smith@mcgill.ca> |
To: | ODG <obligations@uwo.ca> |
CC: | Peter Cane <peter.cane@anu.edu.au> |
pc286@cam.ac.uk | |
Date: | 25/09/2019 13:50:32 UTC |
Subject: | Re: The Miller Case and Standing |
In response to Peter’s perceptive posting, I would like to ask a question about Miller from the perspective of a private lawyer who is
trying to make sense of this.
Neither English court seems to mention standing. The Scottish proceedings were applications for judicial review.
My question is, is Miller itself a relator action? The English cases are styled “R (on the application of Miller) v the PM and others”; ie, the Queen is suing her own Prime Minister.
Traditionally a relator action would have been “R ex relatione Miller” but I thought that was perhaps a terminological update.
If it were, this would explain why standing is not an issue, since the rights being asserted are essentially those of the Crown itself that its government behave properly.
But if it is a relator action, then (as Peter said) the A-G not only has to consent, but can discontinue it at any time, as I understood it, exactly because the rights being asserted are those of the Crown.
On the other hand if it is not, why is the proceeding brought in the name of the Crown, and what standing does Miller have?
I would be glad for any enlightenment!
Lionel Smith
From: Peter Radan <peter.radan@mq.edu.au>
Date: Wednesday, 25 September 2019 at 8:55
To: ODG <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: The Miller Case and Standing
Colleagues,
In a quick read of the Supreme Court decision in the
Miller case, it seems to me that it has an impact of the rule, set out in the House of Lords decision in the Gouriet case, that an Attorney-General's decision to refuse to grant his or her fiat to relator proceedings cannot be reviewed by the
courts because the Attorney General is accountable to parliament.
On the accountability principle, in
Miller, at [33], the Supreme Court said:
Thirdly, the Prime Minister’s accountability to Parliament does not in itself justify the conclusion that the courts have no legitimate role to play. That
is so for two reasons. The first is that the effect of prorogation is to prevent the operation of ministerial accountability to Parliament during the period when Parliament stands prorogued. Indeed, if Parliament were to be prorogued with immediate effect,
there would be no possibility of the Prime Minister’s being held accountable by Parliament until after a new session of Parliament had commenced, by which time the Government’s purpose in having Parliament prorogued might have been accomplished. In such circumstances,
the most that Parliament could do would amount to closing the stable door after the horse had bolted.
The second reason is that the courts have a duty to give effect to the law, irrespective of the minister’s political accountability to Parliament. The fact that the minister is politically accountable to Parliament does not mean that he is therefore immune
from legal accountability to the courts.
The underlined bits suggest to me that a decision by the A-G to refuse to grant his or her fiat relator proceedings is, theoretically at least, subject to judicial review. Indeed, the last quoted
sentence in para [33], seems to echo what Lord Denning said in the Court of Appeal in
Gouriet when he held that the A-G Samuel Silkin's decision to refuse to grant John Gouriet his fiat to relator proceedings could be, and should be, reversed. Of course, the House of Lords held otherwise.
A second point, more in the form of an observation than anything else, is that it is my understanding that one of the reasons for the non-justiciability of the A-G's decision to refuse to grant
of his or her fiat is that the A-G in the UK is more a legal officer than a politician because he or she is not involved in the day-to-day political fray. However, having watched part of Geoffrey Cox's performance in the House today where he called the current
parliament a "disgrace" and, I think, referred to the the opposition as "turkeys", was very much the performance of a politician than that of a legal officer.
I would note on this that in Australia in
Bateman’s Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd (1998), although the High Court unanimously confirmed the application of
Gouriet rule in the Australian context, several members of the court inferred that the
Gouriet rule be inappropriate in Australia precisely because the A-Gs here have, by their own admission, a far more political role than do their British counterparts.
I would welcome any corrections or comments on the above.
Peter
Professor Peter Radan,
Honorary Professor Macquarie University
BA, LLB, PhD (Syd), Dip Ed (Syd CAE), FAAL
Macquarie Law School
6 First Walk,
Macquarie University, NSW, 2109
Australia
Email: peter.radan@mq.edu.au
Blog: https://www.allaboutnothing.info